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In 1991, the Government of Chile began to pursue a new
business development strategy. The Small and Medium-sized
Enterprise Support Programme (Programa de Apoyo a la
Pequeña y Mediana Empresa) provides for a number of
instruments to correct market failures and improve the
efficiency, productivity, competitiveness and international
trading position of Chilean products made by these firms.
The importance of small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs) in the national economy is illustrated by their number
and by the share of jobs they create. The particularly adverse
experience of the economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s,
and the difficulty these companies had in adapting to the
new ground rules of the open economy model, were what
led the Government to decide on this new development
strategy. The objective of this article is to identify and analyse
the policies applied and the effects of the different actions
undertaken and instruments used. Although the strategic
development framework has included new instruments that
have made important contributions to the SME sector, the
overall impact of these is less encouraging. The challenge
now facing companies of this type in Chile is to find ways
of applying successful experiments on a mass scale and
reformulating strategies that have not worked as well as
hoped.
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I
Introduction
In Chile, as in almost all the countries of Latin America,
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) are
important for both economic and social reasons. Their
contribution to job creation and output is substantial,
and increased over the course of the 1990s.
The particularly adverse experience of the
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s, and the
difficulty that most SMEs had in adapting to the new
ground rules of the open economy model and the
reduced and altered role of the State, led the
Government to develop a support strategy designed both
to correct the market failures that limited these
companies’ access to factor markets and to increase their
efficiency, productivity and international trade
participation. The Chilean experience includes some
major achievements, at least where the introduction of
innovative policy instruments and approaches is
concerned. The results have probably been less
encouraging as regards the mass application, and thus
the overall impact, of these instruments and actions.
This article will analyse the place of SMEs in the
country’s economy, the characteristics of the different
lines of business development action, the policies applied
and the role these have played in solving the problems
of such companies. Lastly, the impact of the policies is
considered, and the article’s conclusions are presented.
II
The place of SMEs in the economy
Different definitions of SMEs are used in Chile. The
Ministry of Economic Affairs, Development and
Reconstruction (Ministry of Economic Affairs), the
National Institute of Statistics (INE) and other bodies
use different criteria to define them, which makes their
information difficult to compare.
Until 1993, the Ministry of Economic Affairs
defined small companies as production units with net
annual sales of between 2,400 and 25,000 development
units (unidades de fomento, or UF), i.e., between
US$ 72,000 and US$ 750,000, while medium-sized
enterprises were deemed to be those with sales of
between 25,001 UF and 50,000 UF (between
US$ 750,000 and US$ 1.5 million).1 Companies with
higher sales were classified as large, while those with
sales of less than 2,400 UF were classified as
microenterprises. In 1994, the sales threshold above
which a company qualified as medium-sized was raised
to 100,000 UF (about US$ 3 million). This is the criterion
currently used by the Ministry of Economic Affairs.
Table 1 shows the number of companies of different
sizes, in accordance with the Ministry of Economic
Affairs classification and information supplied by the
Production Development Corporation (Corfo), which
uses data from the Internal Revenue Service (SII). The
change in the definition of medium-sized and large
enterprises in 1994 meant a break in the series for these
two categories, so that two four-year periods, 1990-
1993 and 1994-1997, have to be considered separately.
In both periods, it can be seen that the proportion of
all companies that were SMEs had increased by the end
of the series. The 1994 change in the definition of
medium-sized and large companies also affects the data
on sales, so two four-year periods need to be taken in
this case as well. The data in table 2 show that, in both
the first and the second periods, large companies were
the only ones whose sales grew by more than the average.
By contrast, the sales of the other categories
(microenterprises and SMEs) grew by less than the
average and thus lost market share (table 3). After
accounting for 20.2% of total sales in 1990, by 1993
SMEs had seen their share decline to 19.4%. Similarly,
after the medium-sized enterprise category was
expanded, the sales share of SMEs fell from 25.9% in
1994 to 23.7% in 1997.
This paper was last revised by the authors in July 2000.
1
 The UF is an inflation-indexed unit of real value. On 12 September
2000, one UF was worth 15,507.4 pesos (about US$ 27).
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The employment information is also affected by
statistical problems. Firstly, the data do not come from
the same source as the one used for the other variables
(company sales and number of companies). The
employment data were collected through the National
Socio-economic Survey (Casen) conducted by the
Ministry of Planning and Cooperation (Mideplan)
through the Economics Department of the University
of Chile. As was mentioned earlier, the classification
in this case is based on the number of people in work,
and is therefore not compatible with the one used by
Corfo, which is based on sales.
Until 1994, furthermore, production units
employing between one and five people were defined
as microenterprises, those employing between six and
49 people as small enterprises, those employing
between 50 and 199 people as medium-sized
enterprises, and those employing more than this as large
enterprises. In that year, however, the upper limit for
microenterprises was reduced to four, so that the
TABLE 1
Chile: Number of companiesa
Series 1 Series 2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Microenterprises 364 110 372 311 387 016 400 529 404 599 408 371 423 319 432 431
Small 52 473 59 249 65 611 69 489 71 984 75 570 77 798 78 805
Medium-sized 4 598 5 327 5 797 6 147 9 649 10 260 10 721 10 870
SMEs 57 071 64 576 71 408 75 636 81 633 85 830 88 519 89 675
Large 5 160 6 087 6 838 7 314 4 054 4 388 4 670 4 814
Total 426 341 442 974 465 262 483 479 491 286 498 589 516 508 526 920
Source: Production Development Corporation (2000), on the basis of SII information.
a The series 1 data are not comparable with those of series 2.
TABLE 2










Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of information from




Series 1 Series 2
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Microenterprises 5.5 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.9 4.6 4.6 4.4
Small 14.1 13.3 13.9 13.5 13.8 13.2 13.0 12.5
Medium-sized 6.1 5.8 5.9 5.8 12.1 11.7 11.6 11.3
SMEs 20.2 19.1 19.8 19.4 25.9 25.0 24.6 23.7
Large 74.4 76.0 75.3 75.8 69.2 70.4 70.9 71.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the Production Development Corporation (2000).
a The series 1 data are not comparable with those of series 2.
threshold for small enterprises was lowered to five. As
a result, the information for years prior to 1994 is not
comparable with that for the following years, at least
for microenterprises and small enterprises.
Taking these limitations into account, table 4 shows
that SMEs account for some 50% of all employment in
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the country, while their share of total sales is about 24%.
Comparison of these two figures gives an initial insight
into the productivity differences between SMEs and large
enterprises.
As regards sectoral distribution, SMEs have a very
large presence in commercial activities (36.2% of the
SME total) and a much smaller one (12.9%) in industry
(table 5). The commerce sector, indeed, accounts for
the highest percentage of production units in the cases
of microenterprises and large enterprises as well: 40.5%
of all the country’s enterprises operate in that sector, as
against a figure of only 7.5% for the industrial sector.
Analysis of these data shows that SMEs are very
important for jobs, employing about half of all those in
work. Their share of total sales, however, is much lower
(about 24%). The performance gap between these
companies and large enterprises in the 1990s was not
only large, but widened over the decade. In other words,
despite the positive employment and sales results
achieved by SMEs, the relative weight of large
enterprises increased over the 1990s in terms not just
of absolute sales, but also of sales per worker and per
company, and even of the number of companies.
TABLE 4
Chile: Employment in companies
(Percentages)
1990 1992 1994 1996
Microenterprisesa 43.9 41.8 39.7 40.4
Smalla 29.0 31.6 33.6 36.6
Medium-sized 12.7 13.2 12.8 13.0
SMEs 41.7 44.9 46.4 49.6
Large 14.4 13.3 13.9 10.1
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: National Socio-economic Survey (Casen).
a The definitions of microenterprise and small enterprise used for
the 1994 and 1996 data are different from those used for the 1990
and 1992 data.
TABLE 5
Chile: Sectoral distribution of companies, 1997
(Numbers and percentages)
Company size
Sector Microenterprises SMEs Large Total
Agricultural production 54 174 12.5 8 672 9.7 121 2.5 62 967 12.0
Agricultural and hunting services 1 444 0.3 479 0.5 18 0.4 1 941 0.4
Silviculture 2 380 0.6 965 1.1 41 0.9 3 386 0.6
Fishing 1 223 0.3 427 0.5 74 1.5 1 724 0.3
Mining, petroleum and quarrying 966 0.2 476 0.5 97 2.0 1 539 0.3
Foods, beverages and tobacco 4 455 1.0 2 679 3.0 313 6.5 7 447 1.4
Textiles and leather 6 033 1.4 2 290 2.6 158 3.3 8 481 1.6
Wood and paper 7 675 1.8 2 363 2.6 174 3.6 10 212 1.9
Chemicals, petroleum, rubber and metals 5 668 1.3 2 903 3.2 442 9.2 9 013 1.7
Machinery and instruments 2 136 0.5 1 185 1.3 118 2.5 3 439 0.7
Other manufactures 638 0.1 157 0.2 6 0.1 801 0.2
Industry total 26 605 6.2 11 577 12.9 1 211 25.2 39 393 7.5
Electricity, gas, water 530 0.1 116 0.1 72 1.5 718 0.1
Construction 15 407 3.6 6 618 7.4 587 12.2 22 612 4.3
Commerce 179 320 41.5 32 462 36.2 1 765 36.7 213 547 40.5
Restaurants and the like 22 355 5.2 3 480 3.9 62 1.3 25 897 4.9
Transport 33 727 7.8 7 956 8.9 234 4.9 41 917 8.0
Financial services 7 329 1.7 2 956 3.3 166 3.4 10 451 2.0
Technical and professional services 21 954 5.1 6 654 7.4 230 4.8 28 838 5.5
State, social and institutional services 4 830 1.1 978 1.1 49 1.0 5 857 1.1
Recreation and leisure services 3 640 0.8 651 0.7 26 0.5 4 317 0.8
Personal and household services 33 407 7.7 3 626 4.0 41 0.9 37 074 7.0
Other activities 18 347 4.2 1 435 1.6 15 0.3 19 797 3.8
No information available 4 793 1.1 147 0.2 5 0.1 4 945 0.9
Total 432 431 100.0 89 675 100.0 4 814 100.0 526 920 100.0
Source: Production Development Corporation (1998).
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III
Policies to support SMEs
The Small and Medium-sized Enterprise Support
Programme (hereinafter the Programme) came into
operation in 1991. This represented a major shift away
from the strategy followed by the military Government,
which saw no need to make distinctions in the way it
treated economic units of different sizes (Labarca, 1997)
and affirmed that “the beneficial effects of trade opening
could be enjoyed on a symmetrical and equal footing
by different economic agents” (Cabrera, 1994).
The diagnosis on which the 1991 programme was
based, on the other hand, identified restrictions on access
by SMEs to the factor and service markets, owing chiefly
to information asymmetries, externalities, lack of
appropriability, and indivisibilities and economies of scale.
Setting out from this diagnosis, the Programme
took the approach from the outset that there were market
failures which required correction. While Corfo took
on the functions of an executive secretariat for SME
development policy, the Ministry of Economic Affairs
took responsibility for the strategic design of this policy.
The institutional structure designed to implement
the Programme included different public- and private-
sector bodies acting at different levels. This design has
gradually been modified as the policies have been
implemented. Initially, Corfo used a system of direct
administration of the two main development
instruments, with partial delegation to a subsidiary
agency, the Service of Technical Cooperation
(Sercotec). As the coverage of these instruments grew,
however (because more and more beneficiary
companies were being brought in), it had to alter the
administration system owing to the impossibility of
increasing the number of public officials significantly
to meet the new demand.
For this reason, in mid-1994 a new operating
scheme was introduced in which three levels or “tiers”
were defined (Maggi, 1999). At the first level are the
private-sector companies and consultants providing
technical assistance services for SMEs. At the second
level are intermediate operating agents, namely Sercotec
and a number of Corfo-accredited private-sector
organizations. The basic tasks of these agents are to
promote the use of development instruments by
companies; act as intermediaries between these and
Corfo during the formulation stage, the application
procedure and subsequent follow-up of the use and
outcome of these instruments; administer the public
and private resources involved in the programmes
accountably, and oversee the contractual relationship
between companies and providers.
“Right from the outset, the system established a
strict separation between first and second tier functions,
the intention being that intermediate operating agents
should remain absolutely neutral among providers and
should focus on reducing information asymmetries
between the supply and demand for consultancy, so as
to be in a position to arbitrate if any disagreements
should arise between the providers and the companies
using these services” (Maggi, 1999).
At the third and highest level is Corfo, which is
the institution responsible for designing operations and
regulating instruments, designing framework
agreements with agents, allocating and transferring
programme subsidies to these when they are approved,
and evaluating programme performance.
The instruments used in SME development policies
fall into six categories: financing, technical assistance,
technology transfer and innovation, training, export
promotion and partnership.
1. Financing
Access to financing is one of the most complex
problems that SMEs have to face. The diagnosis carried
out by the Government in the early 1990s revealed stark
segmentation and discrimination by company size in
product and factor markets, resulting among other
things in inequality of access to these markets. For this
reason, the Programme introduced an array of
instruments to narrow the disadvantages faced by SMEs
in the credit market.
Where credit and financing programmes were
concerned, Corfo had previously acted as a direct
lender, i.e., as a first tier institution. A quantitative
evaluation of this experience concluded that it had
resulted in large losses for the State. In 1990, Corfo
closed down the direct lending mechanism and
auctioned off its portfolio, which at that time had a
nominal value of US$ 714 million. The difference
between the value realized by the sale of the portfolio
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 4  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 1172
POLICIES FOR SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES IN  CHILE  •  CECIL IA ALARCÓN AND GIOVANNI  STUMPO
and its nominal value meant a loss of US$ 514 million
for the State (Foxley, 1998).
In 1990, Corfo began to operate as a second tier
institution, direct lending to final users being replaced
by financing for banks and other specialist
intermediaries that channelled resources to the final
customers. This considerably reduced the risk of losses
to the State. The new second tier scheme now includes
a range of programmes that can be classified as lending,
quasi-capital and subsidy programmes. The main
characteristics of these groups of programmes are
described below.
a) Lending programmes
– Investment financing for small and medium-sized
enterprises. This programme is for the financing
of investment projects by companies with turnover
of up to US$ 30 million. It covers investments in
machinery, installations, construction, civil works
and engineering and assembly services, plus the
working capital required for these investments, up
to 30% of the total amount with a maximum of
US$ 5 million. Repayment periods are from two
to 10 years.
– Investment financing for small manufacturers. This
funding is supplied by the Government of Germany
through Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau, and is used
to finance investments and working capital for
manufacturing companies with turnover of up to US$ 3
million in the form of loans of up to US$ 450,000.
Repayment terms range from three to 10 years.
– Financing for production inputs and marketing
abroad. This programme is for the purchase of
inputs to produce exportable goods and services.
It can be taken up by companies with turnover of
up to US$ 30 million, the maximum loan is US$ 3
million, and the term is two to eight years.
b) Quasi-capital programmes
– Purchase of subordinated bonds from banks to
finance SMEs. Corfo buys subordinated bonds from
issuing banks, making the purchase conditional on
these same banks lending to small companies with
annual turnover of up to 25,000 UF (about
US$ 750,000) and developing business platforms
that specialize in dealing with small companies.2
– Financing of Business Development Investment
Funds (FIDES) for venture capital. This consists of
loans that Corfo grants to FIDES on condition that
the funds be used to provide capital to SMEs that
generate high value added or can be identified as
having a high technology content.
c) Subsidy programmes
– Credit Insurance Discount Coupons (Cubos). The
aim of this programme is to remedy the inability
of SMEs to offer any or sufficient collateral for
lending by financial institutions. These institutions
take out credit insurance with an insurance
company to cover the risk of default by the
borrower. The State uses Cubos to co-finance 72%
of the premium for this insurance. The companies
that can take up this subsidy are those with turnover
of less than 25,000 UF (about US$ 750,000), which
means that it is aimed at small enterprises. There
are special rules for granting Cubos to companies
seeking to implement projects in areas that have
suffered severe economic crises and are undergoing
economic restructuring.3 In these cases the subsidy
is 80% and is also available to medium-sized
enterprises.
Other financial instruments, now discontinued, were
also used in the 1990s to support SMEs. They included
in particular the Financial Assistance Subsidy (Suaf),
created in November 1991 to “do away with the
discrimination suffered by small and medium-sized
enterprises that apply for credit without having
organized accounting information or without being able
to submit their investment plan in the requisite form”
(Cabrera, 1994).
Suaf could be applied for by companies with annual
turnover of less than 25,000 UF (about US$ 750,000),
and was to be used to engage consultants who would
prepare and submit the information that financial
institutions required before they would grant a loan to
the Suaf beneficiary company. As the instrument aroused
little interest, medium-sized enterprises were
subsequently allowed to apply as well. In 1996, Suaf
was abolished because of administrative shortcomings
resulting from inadequate oversight of consultants. In
any case, what made the instrument unsuccessful was
the difficulty of “inducing financial institutions to rely
2
 “Subordinate bonds are publicly issued securities whose main
characteristic is that they can be redeemed against the capital of
the issuing bank in a proportion that decreases as the expiry date
of the instrument approaches” (Foxley, 1998).
3
 This is the case with the coal mining zone (province of Arauco
and communes of Lota and Coronel), the provinces of Arica and
Parinacota, and regions XI and XII.
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on evaluations of borrowers carried out by third parties,
in this case consultants working for a State subsidy”
(Foxley, 1998).
Another instrument that was abolished was a
variant of the Cubos which operated from 1995 to 1997,
and which subsidized 50% of small exporters’ credit
insurance premiums. It was discontinued because of
possible incompatibility with World Trade Organization
(WTO) rules.
2. Technical assistance
In order to improve the management of SMEs and help
them introduce new technologies, Technical Assistance
Funds (FATs) were launched in 1993. These funds can
be spent by SMEs on engaging a consultant to improve
overall management or solve specific problems with
issues such as market analysis, product design,
production process redesign, pollution control and
information systems.
The aim of FATs is to facilitate access by SMEs to
advisory services of this kind, while at the same time
encouraging the formation of a consultancy market
specializing in these firms. The great majority of SMEs
use this instrument on an individual basis, although it
is permissible for a number of firms to join forces to
purchase the same service. To use FATs, companies must
have net annual sales of more than 2,400 UF but no
more than 100,000 UF.4
Since 1999, financing for the diagnostic stage has
been included in the programme. To start with, Corfo
provides 12 UF and the business has to contribute 3 UF.
At the actual technical assistance stage, Corfo co-
finances up to 50% of the total cost of the consultancy
work5 up to a maximum of 450 UF (about US$ 13,000)
per company, with an annual limit of 150 UF (about
US$ 4,400).
In the case of a Group FAT (at least three
companies), Corfo provides 30 UF for the diagnostic
stage and the businesses contribute 10 UF. For the actual
technical assistance, Corfo co-finances up to 50% of
the total cost of the consultancy work, with a maximum
of 100 UF per company per year.
Corfo delegates the administration of these funds
to intermediaries (“second tier” organizations) whose
specialization and closeness to the final users is
supposed to make their operations more efficient. These
organizations are responsible for assessing the relevance
of consultancy services, approving consultancy
contracts, monitoring execution and disbursing the
subsidies once execution has been verified.
The central purpose of FATs is to remedy the
information asymmetries that discourage the use of
external consultancy services by SMEs, while deepening
this market by showing applicant firms how useful
external consultancies are for solving operational
problems and drawing up business and modernization
strategies. Although demand has grown, however
(table 6), surveys carried out using samples of
companies have not yielded conclusive results, mainly
owing to the difficulty of isolating the effects of
consultancy on the subsequent performance of the firm
(University of Chile, 1997b). Nonetheless, one of these
assessments affirms that “the FAT scheme has produced
good results in two main areas: the creation of a supply
of consultancies specializing in SMEs, which was not
organized before, and a growing appreciation among
SMEs of the technical assistance services supplied by
private-sector consultancies” (Castillo, 2000).
One aspect of this instrument that is the subject of
continuing debate is the fact that the main incentive is
for those supplying the consultancy services, who often
encourage their customers to make more use of the
instrument than is really necessary. Companies taking
up the service are often not fully aware of its value,
perceiving as the full cost that minority share of it which
is borne by them, and do not demand a minimum of
relevance and thoroughness from the results. To prevent
poor-quality consultancy services being chosen or
subsidies being misused (simulated payment of the
company’s share), Corfo and the operating agents have
taken steps to establish selection criteria in the register
of consultants and to punish severely any illicit practices
they detect (Maggi, 1999).
4
 Companies with net annual sales of less than 2,400 UF or more
than 100,000 UF may apply provided that on the date of the
application they are participating in some other Corfo development
programme or in ProChile-financed Export Committees.
5
 The co-financing percentage rises to 60% in the case of companies
with annual sales of less than 25,000 UF and to 70% for technical
assistance in subject areas to which Corfo gives priority, such as
irrigation, quality and the environment.
TABLE 6
Chile: Number of operations financed by Technical
Assistance Funds (FATs)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
349 1 428 1 487 4 406 4 652 6 632
Source: Production Development Corporation (1998).
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3. Technological development
The main instrument used to stimulate the technological
development of businesses is the National Fund for
Technological Development and Productive Research
(Fontec). This fund, which was created in 1991, can be
used by companies of all kinds (and is thus not an
exclusively SME-oriented instrument), and is intended
to promote, guide, finance and subsidize the
implementation of technological research and
development and technological infrastructure
acquisition projects and, in general, projects to further
any stage in the development of technology products.
This fund operates through five financing lines:
– Technological innovation. This covers research and
development projects for product, process and
services technologies, including models,
prototypes and market testing. The funding
provided by Fontec is a subsidy which may not
exceed 50% of the total cost of the project.
– Technological infrastructure. This line includes
investments in physical infrastructure, installations
and science and technology equipment, and in
technical training for staff connected with the
infrastructure project who play a supporting role
in the company’s production processes and
technological development. The maximum subsidy
granted by Fontec is 20% or 30% of the total cost
of the project, depending on whether the
submission is an individual or group one.
– Group transfer. In this case, subsidy is provided
for projects involving five or more companies in
the same sector or in allied sectors. It generally
covers the planning and implementation of
technology missions abroad, for which Fontec
provides a maximum subsidy of 45% of the total
cost, subject to a US$ 100,000 limit.
– Transfer organizations and centres. This line is also
for group undertakings, specifically when the
purpose is to set up organizations (technology
transfer centres) for the study, development,
dissemination, transfer and adaptation of
technologies with a view to modernizing the
companies involved. The maximum subsidy is
50% of the cost of the project, with a limit of
US$ 400,000.
– Pre-investment studies. This line is aimed at
stimulating innovative investments by funding
pre-investment studies. The maximum subsidy is
50% of the value of the study, with a limit of
US$ 15,000.
Between September 1991 and July 1998, Fontec
approved and financed 997 projects (tables 7 and 8).
Although Fontec is not specifically aimed at SMEs, they
are likely to have been the beneficiaries of a large
percentage of the funding granted. In fact, data for the
period from September 1991 to June 1994 show that
75.8% of the 236 projects approved, and 72% of the
funds, were for small, medium-sized and newly formed
enterprises (Cabrera, 1994).
4. Training
In 1976, the military Government privatized managerial
and administrative responsibility for national training
services by transferring control of almost 70 industrial
schools and the National Professional Training Institute
(Inacap) to the country’s main business association (the
Confederation of Production and Commerce) and by
devolving to companies the responsibility for initiating
and running training programmes financed by the State
through the National Training and Employment Service
(Salazar, 1997).
The main instrument in this field is a tax exemption
that allows businesses to discount up to 1% of taxable
annual remuneration, or a value equivalent to 13
monthly tax units (unidades tributarias mensuales, or
UTM) (about US$ 660 dollars), when they file their tax
returns.6 It is therefore a demand subsidy for corporate
training, in which different agents are involved. In the
first place, the National Training and Employment
Service (Sence), a decentralized State technical body
that relates to the Government through the Ministry of
Labour and Social Security, administers the tax
incentive offered by the State to companies to train their
staff (National Training and Employment Service,
1998). Secondly, there are the private training
organizations (technical provider organizations,
universities, professional institutes and technical
training centres) which carry out the training
programmes. Lastly, there are the companies
themselves, which determine the demand for training.
The results of this instrument have not been very
encouraging for SMEs. In fact, “between 1990 and 1994,
only 18.84% of these companies used the tax
exemption, taking up just 7.56% of the sums available”
6
 In accordance with article 8 of the Tax Code (Decree Law No.
830/74), the UTM is a legally determined, constantly recalculated
sum of money that serves as a measure or reference point for tax
purposes. In August 1999, its value was 26,153 pesos (about
US$ 51).
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(Salazar, 1997). The main problem is that the sum total
of wages paid by a small business (and often by a
medium-sized one) is quite small, which means that
the exemption is not worth enough to justify paying
for training services. For this reason, beginning in 1997,
the limit up to which the exemption could be used was
raised from three to 13 UTM, provided this was no more
than 1% of all taxable annual remuneration. This change
is unlikely to produce significantly different results,
however.
For the same reason, since 1995 Sence has been
operating a training programme for microenterprises
and small businesses that contains two components,
both designed to improve management. The first is
aimed at owners, managers or those performing
administrative functions in companies with annual
turnover of less than 25,000 UF (about US$ 750,000).
The second is aimed at small agricultural producers.
Another measure designed to improve smaller
businesses’ access to occupational training was the 1998
creation of the National Training Fund (Foncap), whose
activities include the provision of subsidies that can be
applied for by companies whose annual turnover does
not exceed 13,000 UTM (about US$ 663,000). These
subsidies are limited to a maximum of 26 UTM (about
US$ 1,300) per company per year.
5. Export promotion
The way most of the export promotion instruments
available in Chile have been designed does not take
account, at least explicitly, of the different sizes of the
TABLE 7
Chile: Projects financed by the National Fund for Technological Development
and Productive Research (Fontec), by sector
Sector Number Total cost Fontec Company Structure
of (thousands contribution contribution of Fontec
projects of dollars) (thousands (thousands contribution
of dollars) of dollars) (percentage)
Agriculture 236 27 414 12 281 15 133 20.2
Forestry 28 3 537 1 628 1 909 2.7
Fishing and fish farming 74 13 338 6 018 7 320 9.9
Mining 36 7 522 3 141 4 381 5.2
Manufacturing 394 59 152 23 651 35 501 38.9
Energy, gas and water 5 1 188 763 424 1.3
Construction 28 3 173 1 318 1 855 2.2
Services 63 10 484 4 912 5 572 8.1
Information technology 104 14 495 5 395 9 099 8.9
Biotechnology 29 3 271 1 599 1 671 2.6
Total 997 143 574 60 705 82 865 100.0
Source: Production Development Corporation (1998).
TABLE 8
Chile: Projects financed by the National Fund for Technological Development
and Productive Research (Fontec), by financing line
(Thousands of dollars)
Line Number of projects Fontec contribution Structure
(thousands of dollars) (percentage)
Technological innovation 812 50 882 83.8
Technological infrastructure 17 2 833 4.7
Group transfer 152 4 853 8.0
Transfer organizations and centres 6 2 014 3.3
Pre-investment studies 10 123 0.2
Total 997 60 705 100.0
Source: Production Development Corporation (1998).
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companies that may sell into external markets. Certain
programmes have proved to be of some importance to
SMEs, however.
The Simplified System of Refunds for Minor
Exports, known as Simplified Refunds, allows
companies exporting non-traditional products to claim
back a small percentage of the fob value of their exports
(between 3.5% and 10%). There is a general
reimbursement mechanism in the country that enables
companies to recover import tariffs paid on inputs used
to produce goods that are then exported. This instrument
involves a complicated application procedure, however,
so that it is mainly used by large companies that have
the staff and information needed to carry this out.
Simplified Refunds was introduced to facilitate this
procedure for SMEs and companies that export
occasionally, and has been very effective in encouraging
a variety of SMEs to begin exporting (Macario, 1998).
The percentage of reimbursement varies, being linked
to total exports of the product concerned: the higher
total exports are, the smaller the percentage applied,
until after a certain point the subsidy disappears.
Despite its success, however, Simplified Refunds
is to be abolished soon, as it is possible for an exporting
company to receive the reimbursement without having
used imported inputs, in which case the instrument acts
as a subsidy. This conflicts with the Uruguay Round
agreements, which provide for all export subsidies to
be abolished by 2002 (Macario, 1998).
A second instrument, aimed more explicitly at
SMEs, is the Support Programme for the Management
of Export Firms (Premex), whose objective is to
enhance the export capabilities of companies producing
manufactures and software. Premex co-finances the cost
of engaging high-level consultants to carry out
diagnostics and to design and introduce improvements
in company management with a view to increasing the
efficiency of production processes and production
planning processes, raising product quality, optimizing
the information systems that support production and
furthering process automation.
At the diagnostic stage, Corfo finances up to 60%
of the value of consultancy work through the same
programme, the subsidy being limited to 80 UTM (about
US$ 4,000). At the implementation stage, the
contribution may be as much as 870 UTM (about
US$ 44,000), covering up to 50% of the value of the
process consultancy. Premex may be applied for by
export companies with external sales of up to
US$ 200,000 and total net sales of up to US$ 10 million
the previous year. The emphasis on pre-competitive
support, the absence of export targets and the small
size of the subsidy suggest that it can be considered as
a non-actionable subsidy, and thus one that is
compatible with WTO rules (Macario, 1998).
As regards support for export activities, two
institutions have proved to be particularly important:
ProChile and Asexma. The Export Promotion Bureau
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ProChile) was set
up in 1975 with the objectives of promoting and
diversifying exports, particularly in non-traditional
categories, and opening up new markets. This institution
has an annual budget of US$ 22 million (of which
US$ 10 million goes on agricultural promotion) and
co-finances market research, the publication of
catalogues and participation in trade fairs and missions.
It also helps groups of companies open offices abroad.
ProChile seems to have been more successful in
introducing medium-sized enterprises to exporting than
small ones.
The Association of Exporters of Manufactures
(Asexma) is a trade organization that provides its
members with information services relating to tariffs,
export procedures and incentives open to them. It
also helps with market analysis and participation in
trade fairs and missions. The Small and Medium-
sized Enterprise Development Project (Propyme),
which it runs with technical assistance from
Germany, aims to improve the export capabilities of
some 40 SMEs.
6. Partnership
Since 1991, the Government has sought to use
Development Programmes (Profos) to encourage
partnerships among companies that operate similar or
complementary lines of business and are located in the
same geographical area. The basic thinking behind this
instrument is that the main problem of SMEs is not so
much size as isolation, and that resources should
therefore be channelled to groups of companies rather
than individual ones.
Formally, a Profo is a partnership with a legal
personality in which small and medium-sized
businesses participate for a maximum of three to four
years. Up to 30% of member companies (of which
there must be at least five in total) may have turnover
higher or lower than the SME limits. It is run by a
manager appointed by the members themselves,
running costs being shared between the public and
private sectors. Corfo may finance up to 70% of the
total costs of the working programme in the first year.
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The businesses, for their part, must finance at least
30% of the costs the first year, 40% the second and
50% the third. Corfo generally co-finances activities
for no more than three years, but an extension for a
fourth year may be obtained if positive results can be
shown and if the group of companies decides to extend
its partnership by forming consortia or undertaking
joint investments.
The amount of the subsidy can be as much as
US$ 100,000 or so a year per group, with a limit of
US$ 12,000 per participating company. The activities
and types of expenditure that these funds can finance
are: the remuneration of the Profo manager and other
support staff, technology transfer seminars, exhibitions,
shows and consultancy work, travel, training and
purchases of specialist books and reviews. Corfo is the
body responsible for regulating the general framework
in which these programmes are carried out and for
approving and allocating funds. The intermediaries
responsible for starting up Profos, and in some cases
for administering them, include public-sector bodies
such as Sercotec and private-sector trade associations
such as the Textile Institute and Asexma. Corfo acts as
a third tier agency, which means it has no direct
executive functions. Its role includes deciding on the
characteristics of the programme, approving the
creation of a Profo when a group of businesses requests
this from the operating body, making available to the
group a percentage of the total resources required for
the project and regulating the conditions under which
they operate.
Management has become decentralized over
time. Sercotec was the institution that promoted and
administered the first Profos. In 1994, it was
decided that implementation of the programme
could be left to private-sector operatives duly
authorized by Corfo. The objective of this decision
was to make management more flexible and lower
administration costs. One interesting innovation was
the inclusion of trade associations as potential
operating agents.
The first Profos began in 1992, since when the
number has grown year by year. The importance they
have taken on in government SME development policy
is reflected by the increase in funding allocated to them
and by the number of companies involved.
In 1996, Corfo asked the University of Chile to
carry out an assessment of this development instrument.
From an analysis of 257 companies grouped into 29
Profos, the assessment identified a number of positive
factors associated with the use of this instrument
(University of Chile, 1997a). More specifically, the
results suggest that the main achievements have largely
been in three fields:
– Company organization and management through
the incorporation of planning elements, better
specification of roles and functions, focusing of
production to achieve economies of scale and
introduction of modern marketing strategies.
– Accumulation of human capital through better
access to management training for managers and
to occupational training for production staff.
– Access to technology institutes, advisors,
consultants and development funds such as Fontec
and FATs.
The business people interviewed said that Profos had
had a particularly positive effect as regards knowledge
of markets and technologies and new business prospects
(table 9).
The assessment of Profos shows that they can be
useful for participating companies. Thanks to the
assistance received, some of these have made quite
substantial changes to certain production and business
practices, as a result of which they have increased
productivity and wages (University of Chile, 1997a).
The assessment also revealed that the type of
intermediary involved was another factor that made a
difference. It was found that, in general, private agents
rooted in trade associations showed better financial
results and were more likely to be able to achieve
technical and business cooperation among participating
companies.
As regards the make-up of the group, mention was
made of the need for the companies involved to be
reasonably diverse (the presence of one or two larger
TABLE 9
Chile: Benefits of Development Programmes
(Profos) as perceived by companies
(Percentage of respondents)a
Better knowledge of markets 48
New business opportunities 42
Knowledge of technologies 39
Improved competitive position 37
Increased profitability through higher sales volumes 27
Increased profitability through cost reductions 19
Improved financing capacity 18
Increased profitability through higher product prices 17
Source: University of Chile (1997a).
a Each respondent could identify more than one factor.
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companies, particularly exporters, can be instructive for
the rest) and to have little overlap among their individual
markets.
The same assessment made it clear, however,
that the programme did not go far enough to correct
major market failures, such as the inability of SMEs
to obtain access on the same terms as large
companies to investment and innovation financing,
and to qualified staff. All the firms surveyed said
that these problems were among the main obstacles
they faced (table 10).
Similarly, the assessment (University of Chile,
1997a) states that “the results of the programme
are found to be less far-reaching when evidence is
sought of significant improvements that make a
real difference to the development and enhancement
of production processes and/or products (except for
changes in lay-out or computerization)”.  In
other words, the impact of the programme on





Chile: Main obstacles identified by companies
(Percentage of respondents)a
Lack of financing 42
Shortage of skilled production staff 31
Customer concentration 31
Economic policy 27
Old machinery and equipment 25
Shortage of skilled administrative staff 22
Lack of installed capacity 21
Customer payment problems 21
Inventory problems 19
Lack of information about technologies 19
Staff resistance to change 18
Delays in responding to customers 15
Narrow product range 15
Unreliable suppliers 10




Source: University of Chile (1997a).
a Each respondent could identify more than one factor.
Unlike most Latin American countries, Chile has
applied an explicit SME support and development policy
for almost a decade. This policy was designed and has
been implemented in the new framework of
deregulation and State withdrawal from direct provision
that has been in place in the country, albeit with different
features at different stages, since the mid-1970s. The
general characteristics of the instruments used have
been based on a logic of corrective action to address
market failures, horizontal intervention and demand
subsidization.
The use of instruments with these characteristics
was motivated by the desire to: i) ensure that the criteria
on which measures were based were consistent all over
the country, ii) limit the discretionary powers of public
officials, both centrally and regionally, iii) achieve
transparency in the use of public resources, iv) direct
the resources available towards the spheres of action
deemed most important, v) reduce the professional
requirements of the institution managing the
instruments, vi) determine the development level,
degree of interest and response capacity of markets
about which there was no direct and specific knowledge,
and vii) obtain private co-financing for development
measures (Dini and Katz, 1997).
Until 1994, i.e., during the SME support
programme’s early years, Corfo operated these
instruments directly. In that year the action strategy was
revised, and Corfo confined its SME development
activities to the strategic level (“third tier”) and
encouraged the creation of a network of coordinating
agents (in both the public and private sectors) “whose
basic function is to design business development
programmes for companies, using the instruments
available to bring together customers (the companies)
and providers of support services (consultants)” (Dini
and Katz, 1997). One of the factors that led to this
change was the impossibility of extending the coverage
of the instruments in use without sharply increasing
policy administration costs. Reorganization of the
public-sector development agencies actually led to a
reduction in the number of civil servants at Corfo (from
601 in 1994 to 464 in 1995) and Sercotec (from 315 in
1993 to 198 in 1995).
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In addition, a number of the administrative
functions of Corfo and Sercotec were decentralized,
and the powers of regional directors were increased.
The changes made to the operating system, with the
introduction of a network of “second tier” private-sector
agents, have been very important in increasing the
coverage of the instruments, owing to the constraints
on the extension of direct public-sector “supply”
referred to, and have probably helped to make SME
support policy more acceptable to businesses.
As regards annual coverage, the number of
companies assisted increased from about 2,000 in 1993
to over 4,000 in 1996 and over 8,000 in 1998. The
resources allocated to SME support activities increased
substantially between 1994 and 1999 (table 11). Both
the two subtotals and the total resources allocated to
SME development increased sharply. The total rose from
US$ 36 million (actually spent) in 1994 to over US$ 95
million (budgeted) for 1999, a real increase of 140%.
Furthermore, the funds earmarked for SME support
policies also increased as a share of all resources
allocated to production development policies in general,
rising from 8.1% of the total in 1994 to 15.8% of the
budgeted total for 1999.
In short, governments since 1990 have shown a
real interest in the problems of SMEs, and this has been
reflected in an increase in the resources allocated, both
in real absolute terms and as a proportion of the total
spent on production development policies. At the same
time, thinking within Corfo itself has led to a change
of approach that has enabled the private sector to play
a greater role in managing and applying the instruments.
This change of approach and the extra funding available
have resulted in a very substantial increase in the
number of companies assisted, which rose from just
over 2,000 to more than 8,000 in five years.
This concern with SME support policies has led
Corfo to bring in outside organizations to assess the
impact of some of the instruments used, something that
is almost unparalleled in Latin America. Despite all
these positive developments, however, the problems
affecting SMEs are very far from having been solved.
Firstly, support policies reach somewhat less than 10%
of the country’s SMEs. It would be difficult to increase
this coverage substantially without doubling or trebling
the funding available, and this is a real problem given
the budgetary constraints within which the public
authorities have to work.
Secondly, it is not just a case of extending coverage
by making greater use of existing development
instruments. The interviews carried out with business
people and trade association representatives by the
TABLE 11
Chile: Spending on SME development measures
(Millions of current dollars)
Spent Budgeted
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Technical Assistance Funds (FATs) 0.33 1.43 4.58 6.97 8.42 0.00
Development Programmes (Profos) 1.00 3.54 8.48 4.96 6.69 15.26
Agricultural FATs and Profos 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.65 12.19
Credit Insurance Discount Coupons (Cubos) 0.41 0.30 0.27 0.46 0.96 0.83
Agricultural investment allowance 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.54 0.80 0.00
Financial Assistance Subsidy (Suaf) 1.95 0.39 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Subtotal I (Corfo SME development measures) 3.70 5.67 13.49 12.93 25.52 28.29
Empresa Nacional de Minería (Enami) national mining company 7.97 6.48 12.61 11.31 12.35 10.84
Production Development Corporation-Service of Technical
Cooperation (Corfo-Sercotec) 1.27 2.54 4.94 8.80 8.64 8.14
National Fund for Technological Development and Productive
Research (Fontec) 8.01 11.92 11.80 12.78 12.03 11.76
Corfo-Premexa 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.08 1.02
Subtotal II 20.95 26.60 42.84 45.93 59.63 60.05
Training, except tax breaks 15.15 12.40 3.95 21.26 28.81 35.45
Total 36.10 39.00 46.78 67.20 88.44 95.50
Share of total production development spending (percentages) 8.1 7.5 7.9 10.3 13.4 15.8
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of Ministry of Economic Affairs data.
a Support Programme for the Management of Export Firms
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University of Chile for its assessments of Profos and
FATs (1997a and 1997b), and the data presented in this
section, show that many of the problems facing
businesses stem from the serious difficulty they have
in obtaining credit. The development instruments used
are designed to solve management problems, but to
promote investment or technological leaps they need
to be supplemented by other instruments of a financial
nature that can mobilize far greater resources than are
currently available to SMEs.
A third problem is the very nature of the
policies implemented and the instruments used.
Although demand-led policies have made it possible
to implement measures that are much better suited
to the needs of companies and to increase the
involvement of the private sector, they have not
greatly enhanced the linkages between businesses
and other institutional actors, particularly local
ones,  such as  the municipal i t ies  and other
organizations that have been crucial to the success
of efforts to develop clusters and highly competitive
networks elsewhere in the world. For this to happen,
it would be desirable for the public authorities to
make more active use of incentives to encourage
linkage between groups of companies and local
institutions.
Fourthly and lastly, the very logic of horizontality
and demand subsidies that characterizes much of
development policy itself poses a very serious problem.
In a policy guided strictly by demand, “the State has to
confine itself to responding to requests from the private
sector and provide assistance exclusively to companies
that know their limitations and are able to draw up
proposals in the formats and within the time limits
specified by the different development agencies” (Dini
and Katz, 1997). Access to the production development
system entails costs, however (the transaction costs
shown in figure 1). There is a group of companies, quite
few in number, that are in a position to defray these
costs and formulate their proposals, but another group,
which includes the great majority of SMEs, is not in a
position to do this, and its demand for services needs
to be induced. This being the case, extending the
coverage of support policies and improving the
efficiency of the instruments used must involve not just
increasing the amount of resources available, but seeing
that public agencies play a more active role in
encouraging this second group of companies.
FIGURE 1
Company access to the production
development system






Small and medium-sized enterprises are an important
component of the Chilean economy, particularly as
regards jobs: they account for some 50% of all
employment, a percentage that rose significantly in the
1990s. When their sales are considered, however, the
situation is different. Although these increased in the
1990s, so that by 1997 they represented 23.7% of the
total, percentage sales growth was much less than
employment growth. What is worse, the figure has been
declining over recent years. This has its counterpart in
the large and widening gap between SMEs and large
companies in sales per person employed.
Industrial SMEs (about 13% of all SMEs) are in a
similar situation.7 As regards SME development
measures, since 1991 there has been an explicit support
policy whose general approach is characterized by
7
 For information on industrial SMEs and an analysis of their
participation in the manufacturing sector, industrial employment,
productivity and exports, see Alarcón and Stumpo, 2000.
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horizontality (there is no specific policy for industrial
firms) and a focus on the correction of market failures.
Among the wide range of instruments used, measures
to encourage partnership among companies (Profos)
have been quite successful, as assessments conducted
by outside organizations have demonstrated.
The results have been less encouraging in the area
of training, at least where the main instrument used
(tax breaks) is concerned. The shortage of skilled labour
in the areas of management and production continues
to be identified as an intractable problem both by
businesses themselves and by independent research into
the subject (Salazar, 1997).
Difficulty in obtaining credit remains an unresolved
problem for SMEs. The policies applied, particularly the
production development instruments and the operations
of Corfo in this area, are generally well regarded. Their
impact on SMEs overall, however, seems to have been
quite limited. This is partly due to the coverage of policy
measures; although this has increased in the last eight
years, it extends to barely 10% of SMEs and is severely
constrained by the limitations on the human and
financial resources that the public authorities can spare
for this purpose. Other problems faced by SMEs range
from the scarcity of credit and the inadequacy of the
training system that supplies them with specialist
personnel to the difficulty of building inter-company
partnerships up into true networks and clusters that are
internationally competitive.
If we look at average sales per worker employed
(table 12), we find that in 1996 the figure for SMEs (about
US$ 13,000) amounted to barely 7% of that for large
companies (about US$ 183,000). There is likewise quite
a large gap between small enterprises (about US$ 9,250)
and medium-sized ones (about US$ 23,200).
Furthermore, the disparity between SME sales and
those of large companies increased not only between
1990 and 1992 (when the policies analysed in this article
were still at a very early stage) but also between 1994
and 1996, by which time the great majority of the
instruments considered were being fully applied.
The wide productivity gap between SMEs and large
companies, and the formers’ lack of international
competitiveness, are very much linked to the factors
examined in this article. They pose SMEs with an array
of complex challenges that will have to be addressed if
these are ever to achieve the competitiveness they need
to insulate themselves, at least to some degree, from
the vicissitudes of their domestic market.
TABLE 12
Chile: Sales per worker, by company sizea
(Large company = 100)
Series 1 Series 2
1990 1992 1994 1996
Microenterprises 2.4 2.1 2.4 1.6
Small 9.5 7.7 8.2 5.0
Medium-sized 9.3 7.9 19.0 12.7
SMEs 9.4 7.8 11.2 7.0
Large 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 19.4 17.7 20.0 14.2
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data from the
Production Development Corporation and the National Socio-
economic Survey (Casen).
a The series 1 data are not comparable with those of series 2.
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